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Abstract. Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (VOPRFs) are
protocols that allow a client to learn verifiable pseudorandom function
(PRF) evaluations on inputs of their choice. The PRF evaluations are
computed by a server using their own secret key. The security of the pro-
tocol prevents both the server from learning anything about the client’s
input, and likewise the client from learning anything about the server’s
key. VOPRFs have many applications including password-based authen-
tication, secret-sharing, anonymous authentication and efficient private
set intersection. In this work, we construct the first round-optimal (on-
line) VOPRF protocol that retains security from well-known subexpo-
nential lattice hardness assumptions. Our protocol requires constructions
of non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge (NIZKAoK).
Using recent developments in the area of post-quantum zero-knowledge
arguments of knowledge, we show that our VOPRF may be securely
instantiated in the quantum random oracle model. We construct such
arguments as extensions of prior work in the area of lattice-based zero-
knowledge proof systems.
1 Introduction
A verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function (VOPRF) is an interactive proto-
col between two parties; a client and a server. Intuitively, this protocol allows a
server to provide a client with an evaluation of a pseudorandom function (PRF)
on an input x chosen by the client using the server’s key k. Informally, the secu-
rity of a VOPRF, from the server’s perspective, guarantees that the client learns
nothing more than the PRF evaluated at x using k as the key where the server
has committed to k in advance. Informally, security from the perspective of the
client guarantees the conditions below:
? The full version of this work is available as [1].
1. the server learns nothing about the input x;
2. the client’s output in the protocol is indeed the evaluation on input x and
key k;
The fact that the client is ensured that its output corresponds to the key com-
mitted to by the server makes the protocol a verifiable oblivious PRF. If we were
to remove this requirement, the protocol would be an oblivious pseudorandom
function (OPRF). From a multi-party computation perspective, an OPRF can be
seen as a protocol that securely achieves the functionality g(x, k) = (Fk(x),⊥)
where Fk is a PRF using key k and ⊥ indicates that the server receives no
output. Applications of (V)OPRFs include secure keyword search [29], private
set intersection [38], secure data de-duplication [40], password-protected secret
sharing [35,36], password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) [37] and privacy-
preserving lightweight authentication mechanisms [23].
A number of these applications have had recent and considerable real-world
impact. The work of Jarecki at al. [37] constructs a PAKE protocol, known as
OPAQUE, using an OPRF as a core primitive. The OPAQUE protocol is in-
tended for integration with TLS 1.3 to enable password-based authentication,
and it is currently in the process of being standardised [41] by the Crypto Forum
Research Group (CFRG)7 as part of the PAKE selection process [19]. In addition,
the work of Davidson et al. [23] constructs a privacy-preserving authorisation
mechanism (known as Privacy Pass) for anonymously bypassing Internet reverse
Turing tests based entirely on the security of a VOPRF. The Privacy Pass pro-
tocol is currently used at scale by the web performance company Cloudflare [60],
and there have also been recent efforts to standardise the protocol design [24].
Both Privacy Pass and OPAQUE use discrete-log (DL) based (V)OPRF con-
structions to produce notably performant protocols. Finally, there is a separate
and ongoing effort being carried forward by the CFRG [25] focusing directly on
standardising performant DL-based VOPRF constructions.
Unfortunately, and in spite of the practical value of VOPRFs, all of the
available constructions in the literature to date (at the time of writing) are based
on classical assumptions, such as decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and RSA. As
such, all current VOPRFs would be insecure when confronted with an adversary
that can run quantum computations. Therefore, the design of a post-quantum
secure VOPRF is required to ensure that the applications above remain secure
in these future adversarial conditions.8 In fact, for full post-quantum security,
both the PRF and the VOPRF protocol itself must be secure in the quantum
adversarial model. While PRF constructions with claimed post-quantum security
are standard, it remains an open problem to translate these into secure VOPRF
protocols.
Constructions of PRFs arising from lattice-based cryptography originated
from the work of Banerjee, Peikert and Rosen [7]. These constructions are post-
quantum secure assuming the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) prob-
7 A subsidiary of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF).
8 Note that using post-quantum secure VOPRF primitives in either the OPAQUE or
Privacy Pass examples above would immediately result in PQ-secure alternatives.
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lem against quantum adversaries [56]. To get around the fact that the LWE
problem involves the addition of random small errors, carefully chosen rounding
is used to obtain deterministic outputs for PRFs based on the LWE assump-
tion [7,13,6]. These earlier works on LWE-based PRFs were followed by construc-
tions of more advanced variants of PRFs [18,16,53]. Despite this, there is yet to
be an OPRF protocol for any LWE-based PRF. The same is true for variants of
these constructions based on the ring LWE (RLWE) problem [6].
Contributions. In this work, we instantiate a round-optimal9 VOPRF whose se-
curity relies on subexponential hardness assumptions over lattices. Our construc-
tion assumes certain non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge
(NIZKAoKs). We use the protocol of Yang et al. [61] as an example instantiation
of the required NIZKAoKs, to argue knowledge of inputs to the input-dependent
part of PRF evaluations from the Banerjee and Peikert design [6] (henceforth
BP14) in the ring setting. Alternatively, one can use Stern-like methods such as
those in [43] and the recent protocol of Beullens [8]. These choices come with
the advantage that results stating the validity of the Fiat-Shamir transform in
the quantum random oracle model (QROM) [27,44] will apply.
We stress that our results show the feasibility of round-optimal VOPRF pro-
tocols based on lattice assumptions, rather than practicality. The performance
of the VOPRF is negatively impacted by the required size of parameters (see
Section 5.3). These parameters are necessary for instantiating our construction
using reasonable underlying lattice assumptions – a consequence of using the
BP14 PRF construction with our proof technique. Moreover, we require heavy
zero-knowledge proof computations to ensure that neither participant deviates
from the protocol. Some of these proofs may be removed by considering certain
optimisations of our main protocol (see Section 3.2). Additionally, removing all
zero-knowledge proofs and considering an honest-but-curious setting may result
in a relatively efficient protocol (see Section 5.3).
Technical Overview. We design a VOPRF for a particular instantiation of the
BP14 PRF in the ring setting. Specifically, for a particular function aF : {0, 1}L →





· aF (x) · k
⌉
where the key k ∈ Rq has small coefficients when represented in {−q/2, . . . , q/2},
and b·e represents rounding a rational to the nearest natural number. Our VO-
PRF protocol can be easily modified to handle other choices of aF (x) (up to a
change in parameter requirements). The security of this BP14 PRF construc-
tion can be reduced to the hardness of RLWE. Consider the PRF for 2-bit
inputs: then aF (x) = a1 ·G−1 (a2) where a1,a2 ∈ R1×`q are uniform and public,
G = (1, 2, . . . , 2`−1) and G−1 (a2) ∈ R`×`2 is binary. Very informally, for small
9 Meaning that only two messages are sent in the online (query) phase.
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e, e′′ ∈ R1×`q , uniform e′ ∈ R1×`q /(Rq ·G) and q much larger than p, we can write⌊
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where u,u′′, ũ are uniform in R1×`q and u
′ is uniform in Rq. The proof of pseu-
dorandomness builds on these ideas.
To provide intuition for our VOPRF design, we describe the rough form of
our protocol (without zero-knowledge proofs). Given a public uniform a ∈ R1×`q ,
the high level overview is as follows:
1. The server publishes some commitment c := a · k+ e to a small key k ∈ Rq.
2. On input x, the client picks small s ∈ Rq, small e1 ∈ R1×`q and sends
cx = a · s+ e1 + aF (x).
3. On input small k ∈ Rq, the server sends dx = cx ·k+e′ for small e′ ∈ R1×`q .
4. The client outputs y =
⌊
p
q · (dx − c · s)
⌉
.
For server security, note that dx = a·s·k+aF (x)·k+e1·k+e′. Suppose that we
choose e′ from a distribution that hides addition of terms e1 ·k, e·s and ex (where
ex is from some other narrow distribution). Then, from the perspective of the
client, the server might as well have sent dx = (a·k+e)·s+e′+(aF (x)·k+ex) =
c ·s+(aF (x) ·k+ex)+e′. Picking ex from an appropriate distribution [6] makes
the term in brackets i.e. aF (x) · k + ex computationally indistinguishable from
uniform random under a RLWE assumption, even given the value of c which is
also indistinguishable from random by a RLWE assumption. This implies that
the message dx leaks nothing about the server’s key k.
For client security, we pick s from a valid RLWE secret distribution and a
Gaussian e. This implies that cx = a · s + e + aF (x) is indistinguishable from
uniform by RLWE. Finally, we must show that the client does indeed recover
Fk(x) as its output y. For correctness, we would like to say that⌊
p
q






· aF (x) · k + p
q






· aF (x) · k
⌉
.
Thus, we guarantee correctness if all coefficients of pq · a
F (x) · k are at least∣∣∣pq (e1 · k − e · s+ e′)∣∣∣∞ away from Z + 12 . It turns out that this condition is
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satisfied with extremely high probability due to the 1-dimensional short integer
solution (1D-SIS) assumption [17] regardless of the way an efficient server chooses
its key. The form of aF (x) is crucial to the connection with the 1D-SIS problem.
In particular, we rely on the fact that we can decompose aF (x) as a′1 ·a′2 where
a′1 ∈ R1×`q is uniform random and a′2 ∈ R`×`q has entries that are polynomials
with binary coefficients.
Ultimately, the security of our VOPRF construction (with particular choices
of NIZKAoK instantiations) holds in the QROM and relies on the hardness of
sub-exponential RLWE and 1D-SIS which are both at least as hard as certain
lattice problems. We discuss parameters in Section 5.3.
Related Work & Discussion. Subsequent to this work, Boneh et al. [12] con-
structed a post-quantum (V)OPRF with comparatively good efficiency from
isogenies. Their construction also uses the random oracle model, but is also
proven secure in the universal composability (UC) model unlike the construc-
tion in this work. A related primitive to a VOPRF is a verifiable random function
(VRF). A VRF is a keyed pseudorandom function allowing an entity with the
key to create publicly verifiable proofs of correct evaluation. Recently, Yang et
al. [61] showed a lattice-based construction of a VRF using the definition of [50].
In fact, the proof systems of Yang et al. serve as a crucial foundation for one way
of instantiating the proof systems used in our VOPRF. However, it should be
noted that the Yang et al. construction (like ours) is not in the standard model
due to the use of the Fiat-Shamir [28] transform.
While our work provides a first construction for a post-quantum VOPRF, it
does not resolve this question completely. The reason VOPRFs enjoy popularity
is their efficiency in the discrete logarithm setting. In contrast, our construction
– while practically instantiable – is far less efficient. This relative inefficiency is
partly due to our choice of relying on lattice-based constructions for our zero-
knowledge proof systems, along with the super-polynomial factors required for
the RLWE-based PRF and noise drowning. Improving these areas thus suggests
ways to achieve concretely more efficient schemes. In fact, we do discuss at-
tempts to optimise our main protocol with a view to reducing the impact of
the zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, one can amortise the costs of the client
zero-knowledge proof by sending queries in batches and sending one proof of a
more complex statement. This saves a small additive term in the overall cost
compared to sending the queries one at a time. Additionally, we discuss the use
of a cut-and-choose approach to removing the server’s zero-knowledge proof at
the effective cost of extra repetitions of the protocol. Ultimately, this does not
improve overall efficiency, but it does dramatically reduce the burden on the
server. For more details, see Section 3.2. An alternative approach is to accept,
for now, that VOPRFs are less appealing building blocks in a post-quantum
world, and to revisit their applications to provide post-quantum alternatives on
a per application basis.
One could alternatively instantiate VOPRFs using generic techniques for
establishing Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols by treating a single ex-
ecution of the VOPRF protocol, for a PRF like AES, as a single invocation of
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a classical two-party actively secure MPC protocol. But this does not give the
round-optimality that we are after. See Appendix E for a discussion about this.
A previous draft of this work presented a protocol roughly analogous to the
main one studied in this work. To give intuition, the starting point of our previous
protocol involved the client hiding aF (x) by multiplying by its own secret s ∈ Rq
and adding some error. The client had to multiply by s−1 ∈ Rq (assuming it
exists) to complete the protocol and it turns out that both s and s−1 had to be
small for correctness. However, for Gaussian s, this is simply not the case. In
order to overcome this obstacle, we used a method for sampling “full” NTRU
keys [34,55]. In more detail, we use the fact that for Gaussian s, t ∈ Rq, we can
efficiently find short (u, v) such that u · s + v · t = 1. Although this trick is not
necessary for building a VOPRF,10 we include it in Appendix D as we believe
that it may have applications elsewhere.
Road Map. We begin with preliminaries in Section 2. Note that Definition 1
deviates from the usual MPC definition. In particular, we argue security against
malicious clients when k is sampled from a key distribution for which the PRF
is pseudorandom, rather than arguing security for arbitrary fixed k. Next is the
VOPRF construction and discussion of optimisations (Section 3) followed by
a high-level description of the zero-knowledge proof instantiations (Section 4).
Finally, we give the security proof for our VOPRF protocol in Section 5.
Our appendices consist of a more detailed account of our computational
hardness assumptions (Appendix A) followed by a collection of miscellaneous
results (Appendix B) and more details of our zero-knowledge instantiations (Ap-
pendix C). To supplement the main body of this work, we also discuss an alterna-
tive construction along with a trick (Appendix D), a generic MPC construction
(Appendix E), and a proof-of-concept implementation in Sage [59] ignoring zero-
knowledge proofs and distributions (Appendix F).
2 Preliminaries
All algorithms will be considered to be randomised algorithms unless explicitly
stated otherwise. A PPT algorithm is a randomised (i.e. probabilistic) algorithm
with polynomial running time in the security parameter κ. We consider the prob-
ability distribution of outputs of algorithms as being over all possible choices of
the internal coins of the algorithm. For a distribution D, we denote the sampling
of x according to distribution D by x← D. We write x← S for a finite set S to
indicate sampling uniformly at random from S. We use the notation D1 ≈c D2 to
mean the distributions D1 and D2 are computationally indistinguishable and ≈s
to denote statistical indistinguishability. We use the standard asymptotic nota-
tions. We let negl(κ) denote a negligible function (i.e. a function that is κ−ω(1))
and write r1  r2 as short-hand for r1 ≥ κω(1) · r2. We say a distribution D is
(B, δ)-bounded if Pr[‖x‖ ≥ B | x← D ] < δ. If a distribution is (B, δ)-bounded
for a negligible δ, then we say that distribution is simply B-bounded.
10 as pointed out by a previous reviewer
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In this work we will use power of two cyclotomic rings. In particular, for some
integer q, we will be considering polynomials in the power-of-two cyclotomic ring
R = Z[X]/〈Xn + 1〉 and Rq := R/qR where n is a power-of-two. R≤c is the set
of elements of R where all coefficients have an absolute value at most c. We also
use a rounding operation from Zq to Zq′ where q′ < q. For x ∈ Zq, this rounding
operation is defined as
bxeq′ := b(q′/q) · xe
where b·e denotes rounding to the nearest integer (rounding down in the case
of a tie). If q′ divides q, we can lift rounded integers back up to Zq by simply
multiplying by q/q′. Note that lifting the result of a rounding takes an x ∈ Zq to
the nearest multiple of q/q′. Therefore, the difference between x and the result
of this rounding then lifting is at most q/(2 · q′). Polynomials and vectors are
rounded component-wise. We write ‖·‖ for the Euclidean norm and ‖·‖∞ for the
infinity norm. We define the norms of ring elements by considering the norms of
their coefficient vectors. Vectors whose entries are ring elements will be denoted
using bold characters and integer vectors will be indicated by an over-arrow e.g.
v has ring entries and #»w has integer entries. Suppose v = (v1, . . . , vn). A norm
of v is the norm of the vector obtained by concatenating the coefficient vectors
of v1, . . . , vn.
Gaussian distributions. For any σ > 0, define the Gaussian function on Rn
centred at c ∈ Rn with parameter σ to be:
ρσ,c(x) = e
−π·‖x−c‖2/σ2 , ∀x ∈ Rn.
Define ρσ(Z) :=
∑
i∈Z ρσ(i). The discrete Gaussian distribution over Z, denoted
χσ assigns probability ρσ(i)/ρσ(Z) to each i ∈ Z and probability 0 to each non-
integer point. The discrete Gaussian distribution over R, denoted as R(χσ),
is the distribution over R where each coefficient is distributed according to χσ.
Using the results of [30,15], χσ can be sampled in polynomial time. Moreover the
Euclidean norm of a sample from R(χσ) can be bounded using an instantiation
of Lemma 1.5 of [5]. We state this lemma next.






∣∣ x← R(χσ)] < negl(κ) .
In addition, following the same reasoning as in [26] we have the following “drown-
ing/smudging” lemma.
Lemma 2. Let σ > 0 and y ∈ Z. The statistical distance between χσ and χσ+y
is at most |y|/σ.
2.1 Verifiable Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions
Recall that the main goal of our work is to build a verifiable oblivious pseu-
dorandom function (VOPRF). A VOPRF is a protocol between two parties: a
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server S and a client C, securely realising the ideal functionality in Figure 1. The
functionality consists of two phases, the initialisation phase and the query phase.
The initialisation phase is divided into two steps: one run once by the server,
and one run once by any client who wishes to utilise the VOPRF provided by
the server. In the event that the functionality FVOPRF receives a valid input k
from S during the initialisation phase, it stores the key for use during the query
phase. This models a server (S) in a real protocol committing to a PRF key k.
Next comes the query phase, where a client C sends some value x to FVOPRF.
Once this value x has been received, the server S either sends the functionality
an instruction to abort or to deliver the value y = Fk(x) to C. Finally, the
functionality carries out this instruction. Importantly, (assuming that no abort
is triggered) the client has the guarantee that its output is indeed Fk(x) i.e. the
output of the client is verifiably correct when interacting with FVOPRF.
This is a two party functionality between a server S and a client C. We assume
there is a fixed PRF function defined by Fk(x).
Init-S: On input of init from the server the functionality waits for an input k
from party S. If S returns abort then the functionality aborts. Otherwise, the
functionality stores the value k if it is a valid key† and aborts if not.
Init-C: On input of init from a client, the functionality will return abort if the init
procedure for the server has not successfully completed.
Query: On input of (query, x) from a client C, if x 6=⊥ then the functionality
waits for an input from party S. If S returns deliver then the functionality sends
y = Fk(x) to party C. If S returns abort then the functionality aborts.
Figure 1. The Ideal Functionality FVOPRF. †The notion of a valid key refers to whether
the key conforms to a pre-determined distribution. See Definition 1 for more details on
this requirement.
We now describe the distributions that arise in the security requirement. We
consider malicious adversaries throughout that behave arbitrarily and begin with
the distributions of interest when a server has been corrupted. First, we consider
a “real” world protocol Π between C(x) and S(k) along with an adversary A.
We denote realΠ,A,S(x, k, 1
κ) to be the joint output distribution of A(k) (when
corrupting S(k)) and C(x) where C(x) behaves as specified by Π. In this setting,
A interacts directly with C. Now we introduce a simulator denoted Sim that lives
in the “ideal” world. Specifically, still assuming A corrupts a server, Sim interacts
with A on one hand and with C(x) via FVOPRF on the other. In this setting, for
any client/server input pair (x, k), we define idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,S(x, k, 1
κ) to be the
joint output distribution of A(k) and the honest client C(x) when A(k) interacts
via Sim. Informally, one may interpret Sim as an attacker-in-the-middle between
A and the outside world where Sim interacts with FVOPRF external to the view
of A. Security argues that whatever A can learn/affect in the real protocol can
be emulated via Sim in the ideal setting.
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Next, we describe the distributions of interest when a client has been cor-
rupted by an adversary A. We let K denote the key distribution under which
PRF security of F holds. First, consider a “real” world case where A corrupts
C(x) and directly interacts with honest S(k) which follows the specification of
protocol Π. In this case, we use realΠ,A,C(x,K, 1κ) to denote the joint output
distribution of A(x) and S(k)11 where k ← K. Now consider an alternative
“ideal” world case where we introduce a simulator Sim interacting with A on
one hand and with S(x) via FVOPRF on the other hand. Once again, one may
wish to interpret the simulator as an attacker-in-the-middle interacting with
FVOPRF external to the view of A. In this alternative case, we denote the joint
output distribution of A(x) and S(k) where A interacts via Sim and k ← K as
idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,C(x,K, 1κ).
Finally, for protocol Π, let output(Π,x, k) denote the output distribution of
a client with input x running protocol Π with a server whose input key is k.
Using the notation established above, we can present our definition of a VOPRF.
Definition 1. A protocol Π is a verifiable oblivious pseudorandom function if
all of the following hold:
1. Correctness: For every pair of inputs (x, k),
Pr[output(Π,x, k) 6= Fk(x)] ≤ negl(κ) .
2. Malicious server security: For any PPT adversary A corrupting a server,
there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for every pair of inputs (x, k):
idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,S(x, k, 1
κ) ≈c realΠ,A,S(x, k, 1κ).
3. Average case malicious client security: For any PPT adversary A cor-
rupting a client, there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that for all client
inputs x:
– idealFVOPRF,Sim,A,C(x,K, 1κ) ≈c realΠ,A,C(x,K, 1κ).
– If A correctly outputs Fk(x) with all but negligible probability over the
choice k ← K when interacting directly with S(k) using protocol Π, then
A also outputs Fk(x) with all but negligible probability when interacting
via Sim.
We now discuss this definition. Note that the correctness and malicious server
security requirements are the standard ones used in MPC. Therefore, we restrict
this discussion to the condition that we call average case malicious client security.
The motivation for this non-standard property is that an honest server will
always sample a key from distribution K as it wishes to provide pseudorandom
function evaluations. In particular, PRF security holds with respect to this key
distribution K. Therefore, it makes sense to ask what a malicious client may
learn/affect only in the case where k ← K which leads to the first point of
our average case malicious client security requirement. The second point of the
11 Note that the output of S(k) is ⊥ in our construction.
9
requirement captures the fact that adversaries may have access to an oracle that
checks whether the PRF was evaluated correctly or not. Suppose that we give
the adversary A access to an oracle which can check an input/output pair to
the PRF is valid or not. Then A should not be able to distinguish whether
it is interacting with a real server S or a simulation Sim. Note that our proof
structure relies heavily on our alternative malicious client security definition. In
particular, the definition above allows us to argue over the entropy of secret keys
when making indistinguishability claims.
Alternative definitions Note that alternative security definitions exist for (V)OPRFs.
In the UC security models that are favoured by Jarecki et al. [35,36] the output
of the PRF is wrapped in the output of a programmable random oracle evalu-
ation. This is a fact that is utilised by the OPAQUE PAKE protocol [37] that
allows arguing that the pseudorandom function evaluations are pseudorandom
even to the server (the key-holder). Unfortunately, using a similar technique
here is difficult as constructing programmable random oracles in the quantum
random oracle model (QROM) is known to be difficult [11].
2.2 Computational Assumptions
Here we present the presumed quantum hard computational problems that will
be used in our security proofs. Evidence that these problems are indeed quantum
hard follows via reductions from standard lattice problems (see Appendix A).
These reductions from lattice problems will be used to asymptotically analyse
secure parameter settings for our VOPRF. The first is the standard decisional
RLWE problem [47].
Definition 2. (RLWE problem) Let q,m, n, σ > 0 depend on κ (q,m, n are
integers). The decision-RLWE problem (dRLWEq,n,m,σ) is to distinguish between:
(ai, ai · s+ ei)i∈[m] ∈ (Rq)
2
and (ai, ui)i∈[m] ∈ (Rq)
2
for ai, ui ← Rq; s, ei ← R(χσ).
We sometimes write dRLWEq,n,σ, leaving the parameter m (representing the
number of samples) implicit. The second problem is slightly less standard. It is
the short integer solution problem in dimension 1 (1D-SIS). The following for-
mulation of the problem was used in [17] in conjunction with a lemma attesting
to its hardness. See Appendix A for more details.
Definition 3. (1D-SIS, [17, Definition 3.4]) Let q,m, t depend on κ. The one-
dimensional SIS problem, denoted 1D-SISq,m,t, is the following: Given a uniform
v ← Zmq , find non-zero z ∈ Zm such that ||z||∞ ≤ t and 〈v, z〉 ∈ [−t, t] + qZ.
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2.3 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge
The foundations of zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems were established in a
number of works [28,33,32,10]. At a high level, a ZK proof system for language
L allows a prover P to convince a verifier V that some instance x is in L, without
revealing anything beyond this statement. Further, a ZK argument of knowledge
(ZKAoK) system allows P to convince V that they hold a witness w attesting to
the fact that x is in L (where the L is defined by a relation predicate PL(x,w)).
Definition 4. (NIZKAoK) Let P be a prover, let V be a verifier, let L be a
language with accompanying relation predicate PL(·, ·). Let WL(x) be a generic
set of witnesses attesting to the fact that x ∈ L, i.e. ∀x ∈ L, and w ∈ WL(x) we
have PL(x,w) = 1. Let nizk = (Setup,P,V) be a tuple of algorithms defined as
follows:
– crs← nizk.Setup(1κ): outputs a common random string crs.
– π ← nizk.P(crs, x, w): on input crs, a word x ∈ L and a witness w ∈ WL(x);
outputs a proof π ∈ {0, 1}poly(κ).
– b← nizk.V(crs, x, π): on input crs, a word x ∈ L and a proof π ∈ {0, 1}poly(κ);
outputs b ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 5. (NIZKAoK Security) We say that nizk is a non-interactive zero-
knowledge argument of knowledge (NIZKAoK) for L if the following holds.




1← nizk.V(crs, x, π)
∣∣∣crs←nizk.Setup(1κ)π←nizk.P(crs,x,w) ] ≥ 1− negl(κ) .
2. (Computational knowledge extraction): The proof system satisfies computa-
tional knowledge extraction with knowledge error κ̄ if, for any PPT prover
P∗ with auxiliary information aux, the following holds. There exists a PPT
algorithm nizk.Extract and a polynomial p such that, for any input x, then:
Pr[1← PL(x,w′)|w′ ← nizk.Extract(P∗(crs, x, aux))] ≥
ν − κ̄
p(|x|)
is satisfied, where ν is the probability that nizk.V(crs, x,P∗(crs, x, aux)) out-
puts 1.
3. (Computational zero-knowledge): There exists a simulated setup algorithm
nizk.SimSetup(1κ) outputting crsSim and a trapdoor T along with a PPT al-







∣∣(crsSim, T )← nizk.SimSetup(1κ)}
∀x ∈ L and w ∈ WL(x).
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Interactive proof systems. An interactive proof system is one where the proving
algorithm (P) requires interaction with the verifier. Such an interaction could be
an arbitrary protocol, with many message exchanges, but a typical (in the hon-
est verifier case) scenario is a three-move protocol consisting of a commitment
(from the prover), a uniformly chosen challenge (from the verifier) and then a
response (from the prover). Such protocols are referred to as Σ-protocols. Fiat
and Shamir [28] established a mechanism of switching a (constant-round) hon-
est verifier zero-knowledge interactive proof of knowledge into a non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge in the random oracle model (ROM). In par-
ticular, the random challenge provided by the verifier is replaced with the output
of a random oracle evaluation taking as input the statement x and the provers ini-
tial commitment. It was recently shown that the standard Fiat-Shamir transform
is also secure in the quantum ROM (QROM) [27,44] assuming the underlying
Σ-protocol satisfies certain properties.
2.4 Lattice PRF
We will use an instantiation of the lattice PRF from [6]. Below, we present
relevant definitions/results, all of which are particular cases of definitions/results
from [6]. We set ` = dlog2 qe throughout. The construction from [6] makes use
of gadget matrices that can be found in many previous works [51,6,17,31].
Gadgets G,G−1. Define G : R`×`q → R1×`q to be the linear operation correspond-
ing to left multiplication by (1, 2, . . . , 2`−1). Further, define G−1 : R1×`q → R`×`q
to be the bit decomposition operation that essentially inverts G i.e. the ith col-
umn of G−1(a) is the bit decomposition of ai ∈ Rq into binary polynomials.
The instantiation of [6] that we will present our VOPRF with respect to is
defined as Fk(x) = bax · kep for ax ∈ R1×`q given below.
Definition 6. Fix some a0,a1 ← R1×`q . For any x = (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ {0, 1}
L
.
We define ax ∈ R1×`q as











The pseudorandomness of this construction follows from the ring learning
with errors (RLWE) assumption (with normal form secrets).
Theorem 1 ([6]). Sample k ← R(χσ). If q  p ·σ ·
√
L ·n · `, then the function
Fk(x) = bax · kep is a PRF under the dRLWEq,n,σ assumption.
When we eventually prove security of our VOPRF, it will be useful to define
a special error distribution such that ax · k + e remains indistinguishable from
uniform (under RLWE) when e is sampled from this special error distribution.
To this end, we introduce the distributions Ea0,a1,x,σ followed by a lemma that
is implicit in the pseudorandomness proof of the PRF from [6].
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Definition 7. For a0,a1 ∈ R1×`q , define
ax\i := G
−1 (axi+1 ·G−1 (axi+2 ·G−1 (· · · (axL−1 ·G−1 (axL)) · · · ))) ∈ R`×`q .
Furthermore, let Ea0,a1,x,σ be the distribution that is sampled by choosing ei ←
R(χσ)
1×`




ei · ax\i + eL.
Lemma 3 (Implicit in [6]). If a0,a1 ← R1×`q , e← Ea0,a1,x,σ and s← R(χσ),
then for any fixed x ∈ {0, 1}L,
(a0, a1, ax · s+ e)
is indistinguishable from uniform random by the dRLWEq,n,σ assumption.
In addition to introducing Ea0,a1,x,σ, it will be useful to write down an upper
bound on the infinity norm on errors drawn from this distribution. The following
lemma follows from the fact that for y ← χσ, ‖y‖∞ ≤ σ
√
n with all but negligible
probability by Lemma 1. In fact, we could use the result that ‖y‖∞ ≤ σnc
′
with
probability at least 1−c ·exp(−πn2c′) for any constant c′ > 0 and some universal
constant c to reduce the upper bound, but we choose not to for simplicity.
Lemma 4 (Bound on errors). Let x ∈ {0, 1}L, ` = dlog2 qe and n = poly(κ).
Samples from Ea0,a1,x,σ have infinity norm at most L · ` · σ · n3/2 with all but
negligible probability.
3 A VOPRF Construction from Lattices
In this section, we provide a construction emulating the DH blinding construction
H(x)
k
= (H(x) · gr)k/(gk)r. In what follows, we will initially ignore the zero-
knowledge proofs establishing that all computations are performed honestly. A
detailed description of the protocol is in Figure 2 but the main high-level idea
follows.
Recall that we are working with power-of-two cyclotomic rings. Informally,
suppose a client wants to obtain a′ · k + e′ ∈ Rq (where e′ is relatively small)
from a server holding a short k without revealing a′ ∈ Rq. Further, suppose that
the server has published an LWE instance (a, c := a ·k+ e) for truly uniformly a
and small Gaussian e. One way to achieve our goal is to have the client compute
cx := a · s+ e1 + a′ for Gaussian (s, e1). Next the server responds by computing
dx := cx · k + e′′ for relatively small e′′ and the client finally outputs
dx − c · s = (a · s+ e1 + a′) · k + e′′ − (a · k + e) · s
= a′ · k + (e1 · k − e · s+ e′′)
≈ a′ · k.
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The above gives the intuition behind our actual protocol. Roughly, the idea
is to replace a′ with ax from a BP14 evaluation. As mentioned above, a more
detailed formulation of our construction is given in Figure 2. In the protocol
description, Pi and Vi denote prover and verifier algorithms for three different
zero-knowledge argument systems indexed by i ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
CRS SetUp: To set up the CRS execute the following steps:
– Pick a0,a1 ← R1×`q
– Sample a← R1×`q , sample crs0 for proof system P0 and set crs0 := (crs0,a)
– Sample crs1 and crs2 for proof systems P1 and P2 respectively
Init: The initialisation procedure is executed by the server S and a client C both
with initial input crs0.
– Init-S: The server S executes the following steps
• k ← R(χσ), e← R(χσ)1×`.
• c← a · k + e mod q.
• π0 ← P0(k, e : crs0, c).
and sends (c, π0) to a client C.
– Init-C: On receipt of (c, π0) a client executes
• b← V0(crs0, c, π0).
• Output abort if b = 0, otherwise store c.
Query: This is a two round protocol between a client and the server, with a client
going first.
1. On input of (x ∈ {0, 1}L, crs1, crs2) a client C executes the following steps
– s← R(χσ), e1 ← R(χσ)1×`.










– cx ← a · s+ e1 + ax mod q.
– π1 ← P1(x, s, e1 : crs1, cx,a,a0,a1).
and sends (cx, π1) to the server S.
2. On receipt of (cx, π1) the server S executes the following steps
– b← V1(crs1, cx,a0,a1, π1).
– Output abort if b = 0
– e′ ← R(χσ′)1×`.
– dx = cx · k + e′ mod q.
– π2 ← P2(k, e′, e : crs2, c,dx, cx,a).
and sends (dx, π2) to a client C while outputting ⊥.
3. On receipt of (dx, π2) a client C executes
– b← V2(crs0, crs2, c,dx, cx, π2).
– Output abort if b = 0.
– yx = bdx − c · sep.
– Output yx.
Figure 2. VOPRF construction
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3.1 Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge Statements
The arguments of Pi algorithms fall into two groups separated by a colon. Argu-
ments before a colon are intended as “secret” information pertaining to a witness
for a statement. Arguments after a colon should be interpreted as “public” in-
formation specifying the statement that is being proved.
Client Proof. The client proof denoted P1(x, s, e1 : crs1, cx,a,a0,a1) should
prove knowledge of
– x ∈ {0, 1}L
– s ∈ R where ‖s‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n
– e1 ∈ R1×` where ‖e1‖∞ ≤ σ
√
n
such that cx = a · s+ e1 + ax mod q.
Server Proofs. The server proof in the initialisation phase denoted P0(k, e :
crs0, c) has the purpose of proving knowledge of k ∈ R, e ∈ R1×` where ‖k‖∞,
‖e‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n such that c = a · k + e mod q where crs0 contains a.
The server proof in the query phase denoted by P2(k, e′, e : crs2, c,dx, cx,a) has
the purpose of proving that there is some
– k ∈ R where ‖k‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n
– e ∈ R1×` where ‖e‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n




c = a · k + e mod q,
dx = cx · k + e′ mod q. (1)
It is important to note that both c and dx each consist of ` ring elements.
Therefore, the above system consists of a total of 2` noisy products of public
ring elements and k. Note that the well-definedness of normal form RLWE (where
the secret is drawn from the error distribution) implies that the witnesses used
by the prover in π0 and π2 share the same value k.
3.2 Optimisations
Removing P0 using Trapdoors. The main purpose of proof system 0 is to
allow the security proof to extract k and forward it on to the functionality.
On removing this proof, if the server does not commit to its key properly, it
cannot carry out the zero-knowledge proof in the Query phase, leading to a
protocol where no evaluations are given to clients. An alternative to the server’s
NIZKAoK in the Init-S phase, the proof could extract k via trapdoors. Using
the methods of Micciancio and Peikert [49], one can sample a trapdoored a ∈ Rmq
for m = O(`) that is indistinguishable from uniform where the trapdoor permits
15
efficient inversion of the function ga(k, e) = a · k + e for small e. Therefore, the
malicious server security proof could extract k in the Init-S phase by using a
trapdoored a along with the inversion algorithm. For clarity and simplicity, we
do not incorporate these ideas directly into our protocol.
Truncating the PRF. Although the protocol in Figure 2 is concerned with
the evaluation of the full BP14 PRF, we may consider a truncated version of
the PRF to improve efficiency. In particular, the BP14 PRF is evaluated as
Fk(x) := bax · kep ∈ R1×`p but we could easily truncate particular quantities in
our protocol to consider the PRF F ′k(x) := bax · kep where ax is the ring element
appearing in the first entry of ax. The relevant values that are truncated from
` ring elements to a single ring element from our protocol are c,ax, cx,dx,yx.
Ignoring the zero-knowledge elements of the protocol, this saves us a factor of
`. However, computation of the full ax must still be performed by the client
in order to calculate the truncated value. Additionally, the computation of ax
will still need to be considered by the client’s zero-knowledge proof. As we will
see in Section 4 and Appendix C, the computation of ax is the main source of
inefficiency in the zero-knowledge proofs and our overall protocol. Therefore, we
do not trivially save a factor of ` in computation time and zero-knowledge proof
size by using a truncated BP14 PRF.
Batching Queries. We can save on the cost of zero-knowledge proof of the
server in the Query phase by batching VOPRF queries. When the client sends
a single value cx, the server proves that c and cx are computed with respect
to the same k. If the client sends N individual queries, the server proves that
c and cx1 are with respect to the same k and then independently proves that
c and cx2 are with respect to the same k and so on. Instead, the server could
simply prove that c, cx1 , . . . , cxN are all with respect to the same k in one shot,
saving an additive term of O(N · `) in communication over N different VOPRF
evaluations (although the overall complexity of the communication does not
change asymptotically).
Cut-and-choose. Another way in which we can improve efficiency (from the
server’s perspective) is to remove some of the zero-knowledge proofs using a
cut-and-choose methodology. In particular, we can remove the need for the zero-
knowledge proof from the server in the Query phase as follows. Firstly, in the
Init-S phase, we make the server publish (for small k) the value y := bax′ · kep
for some fixed x′ in addition to the value a · k + e as well as a zero-knowledge
proof attesting to the correct computation of these values for small k. The next
change comes in the client message in the Query phase. Instead of sending a
single pair (cx, π1), the client chooses a uniform subset X of {1, . . . , N} of size
K. The client then sends N values (cx1 , . . . , cxN ) where for all j ∈ X, xj = x′
and for all j′ /∈ X, xj′ = x for some x chosen by the client and a NIZKAoK
attesting to this computation. The server then computes dx1 , . . . ,dxN as it does
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in Figure 2 using cx1 , . . . , cxN respectively. Next, the client processes each dxi
individually to compute the values yx1 . . .yxN as in the plain protocol. Finally,
the client aborts if any of the following hold:
– there exists a j∗ ∈ X such that yxj∗ 6= y
– yxj′ are not all equal for j
′ /∈ X
– yxj′ = y for all j
′ /∈ X (see explanation below)
Otherwise, the client accepts yx = yxj′ for any j
′ /∈ X as the evaluation at
x. The client now must create N proofs for the most complex statements. On
the other hand, the server does not need to create any proofs whatsoever in the
online phase. The only way for the server to cheat now is to somehow guess






. Thus, the computational burden is mostly shifted to the client,
which might be desirable in some settings.
On close inspection, there is a slight problem with the cut-and-choose op-
timisation described above. The issue is that a client might ask for an eval-
uation on input x such that bax · kep = bax′ · kep in which case the third
condition causes an abort, even though the client obtained the correct evalu-
ation. One way to get around this is to redefine the PRF slightly so that such
collisions only occur with negligible probability. For example, for L − 1 bit in-






Since we can rewrite a0‖x · k = a0 · Zx,k where Zx,k has small entries as
long as k is short. Then a collision in this PRF must lead to an equation






= 0 mod q which means that such a collision
would imply a solution to a ring-SIS problem with respect to [1|a] (in Hermite
normal form). Therefore, for fixed x and any short k, it is unlikely that a collision
in this alternative PRF will occur under some SIS assumption.
3.3 Correctness
Before proving correctness, we present a lemma that we will apply below. The
proof of this lemma is in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 5. Fix any x ∈ {0, 1}L. Suppose there exists a PPT algorithm Dx(a0,a1)
that outputs r ∈ R such that ‖r‖∞ ≤ B and at least one coefficient of ax · r is in
the set (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ] with non-negligible probability (over a uniform choice
of a0,a1 ← R`q and its random coins). Then there exists an efficient algorithm
solving 1D-SISq/p,n`,max{n`B,T} with non-negligible probability.
Lemma 6 (Correctness). Adopt the notation of Figure 2, assuming an honest
client and server. Define T := 2σ2 n2 + σ′
√
n. For any x ∈ {0, 1}L, k ∈ Rq such
that ‖k‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n, we have that
Pr[yx 6= Fk(x)] ≤ negl(κ)
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over the choice of PRF parameters a0,a1 ← R1×`q assuming the hardness of
1D-SISq/p,n`,T .
Proof. Fix an arbitrary x. Assume there exists a k′ such that ‖k′‖ ≤ σ ·
√
n where
Pr[yx 6= Fk′(x)] is non-negligible over the choice of a0,a1 ← R1×`q . Expanding
c and dx from the protocol, we have that
yx = bax · k′ + e1 · k′ + e′ − e · sep .
Note that e′′ := e1 · k′ − e · s + e′ has infinity norm less than T as defined in
the lemma statement with all but negligible probability. It follows that there
must be at least one coefficient of ax · k′ in the set (q/p) · Z + [T, T ] with non-
negligible probability, otherwise yx = bax · k′ep =: Fk′(x). Applying Lemma 5
to the algorithm Dx(a0,a1) that ignores a0,a1 and simply outputs k′ implies
an efficient algorithm solving 1D-SISq/p,n`,max{n3/2`σ,T}. ut
The remainder of the security proof can be found in Section 5.
4 Lattice-based NIZKAoK Instantiations
We now describe various instantiations of our zero-knowledge arguments of
knowledge. Note that we use the Fiat-Shamir transform (on parallel repetitions)
to obtain non-interactive proofs. We recall that the Fiat-Shamir transform has
recently been shown to be secure in the QROM [27,44] in certain settings. We
place most of our attention on discussing how to instantiate Proof System 1,
as the other proof systems may be derived straight-forwardly using a subset of
the techniques arising in Proof System 1. For more precise details on how to in-
stantiate Proof System 1 using the protocol of Yang et al. [61], see Appendix C.
Alternatively, one could use the same techniques as in [43] to represent the state-
ment of interest in Proof System 1 as a permuted kernel problem and use the
recent protocol of Beullens [8]. The advantage of doing so would be that the
protocol of Beullens has been shown to be compatible with the aforementioned
security results of the Fiat-Shamir transform in the QROM.
Note that the argument system of Yang et al. requires the modulus q to be
a prime power. In contrast, 1D-SIS is known to be at least as hard as standard
lattice problems when q has many large coprime factors [17]. In order to justify
the use of a prime power modulus along with the use of the 1D-SIS assumption,
we apply Lemmas 12 and 13 from Appendix B. Alternatively, if one wished to use
a highly composite modulus, then a Stern-based protocol such as in [42,43] or the
more efficient recent protocol of Beullens [8] may still be used. Nonetheless, all
of the aforementioned argument systems involve rewriting PRF evaluations as a
large system of linear equations. In our context, applying the argument system
of Yang is slightly simpler. Additionally, a single execution of the protocol of
Yang et al. achieves a soundness error of 2/(2p̄+ 1) for some polynomial p̄ much
less than q. This is similar to the soundness error encountered in the Beullens
protocol, but significantly improves on the soundness of Stern-based protocols.
Therefore, roughly κ/ log p̄ repetitions are required to reach a 2−κ soundness
error when using either of the protocol of Yang et al. or Beullens protocols.
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Proof System 0: Small Secret RLWE Sample. Let A ∈ Zn`×nq be the
vertical concatenation of the negacyclic matrices associated to multiplication by
the ring elements of a ∈ R1×`q respectively. Further, let #»c ∈ Zn`q be the vertical
concatenation of coefficient vectors of ring elements in c ∈ R1×`q respectively.
The first proof aims to prove in zero knowledge, knowledge of a short solution
#»x := ( #»x 1,
#»x 2), where ‖ #»x‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n to the system
#»c = A · #»x 1 + #»x 2 mod q.
This is an inhomogeneous SIS problem, so the zero-knowledge proof may be
instantiated using either the protocol of Yang et al. or Beullens. Additionally,
for this proof system, we may also use the protocol from [14]. All of these op-
tions avoid the so-called soundness gap seen in many lattice-based proof systems
(e.g. [45,46]) although the efficient protocol in [46] has been shown to be secure
in the QROM when the Fiat-Shamir transform is applied [44]. Therefore, for
simplicity and neatness we prefer to consider these systems when writing the
security proof for our VOPRF although one may use the more efficient protocol
of [46] in practice.
Proof System 1: Proofs of Masked Partial PRF Computation. This
proof system aims to prove that for a known a and c, the prover knows short
s and e along with a bit-string x such that c = a · s + e + ax where ax is
part of the BP14 PRF evaluation. At a high level, we will run the protocol of
Yang et al. [61] O(κ/ log p̄) times (for some p̄ = poly(κ)) in parallel and apply
the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. We focus on this instantiation for simplicity. We do
not actually concretely present any ZKAoK protocol in this work, but we do
highlight the reduction (Appendix C) showing that we may use the protocol of
Yang et al. Similar methods (e.g. the decomposition-extension framework used
by[43]) can be used to prove compatibility with the protocol of Beullens. Let Pn
represent the power set of {1, . . . , n}3. The protocol of Yang et al. is a ZKAoK
for the instance-witness set given by
R∗ =
{(
(A, #»y ,M), #»x
)
∈ Zm×nq × Zmq × Pn × Znq :
A· #»x= #»y mod q ∧
∀(i,j,k)∈M,xi=xj ·xk mod q
}
.
Therefore, in order to show that we may use the protocol, we simply reduce
our statement of interest to an instance ((A′, #»y ′,M′), #»w ′) ∈ R∗. Then, the
protocol of Yang et al. allows to argue knowledge of a witness #»w ′ such that
((A′, #»y ′,M′), #»w ′) ∈ R∗. Details on reducing statements of the relevant form to
instances in R∗ are given in Appendix C, but a high level overview follows.
First note that we can compute ax recursively (similarly to [43]) by setting
variables Bi ∈ R`×`q for i = L − 1, . . . , 0 via BL−1 = G−1(axL−1), and Bi =
G−1(axi · Bi+1) for i = L − 2, . . . , 0. Using this, we have ax = G · B0. We can
therefore use the system G ·Bi = axi ·Bi−1 to facilitate computation of ax along
with the linear equation c = a·s+e1+G·B0 to completely describe the statement
being proved. However, the resulting system is over ring elements and is not
linear in unknowns. To solve these issues, we simply replace ring multiplication
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by integer matrix-vector products and then linearise the resulting system (which
places quadratic constraints amongst the entries of the solution). We also make
use of binary decompositions to bound the infinity norms of valid solutions and
ensure that necessary entries are in {0, 1} via quadratic constraints. 12
Proof System 2: Proofs of Secret Equivalence. Recall that we wish to
prove existence of a solution to Equations (1). Note that dx from the protocol
in Section 3 are vectors holding ` ring elements. Therefore, Equations (1) can be
expressed as a system
ci = ai · k + ei i = 1, . . . , `,
(dx)i = (cx)i · k + e′i i = 1, . . . , `,
where ‖ei‖∞, ‖k‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n, ‖e′i‖∞ ≤ σ′ ·
√
n. We can conceptualise the above
as a large linear system A′ · #»x = #»c where #»x is the concatenation of coefficient
vectors of k, e1, . . . , e`, e
′
1, . . . , e
′
` and
#»c is the concatenation of the coefficient vec-
tors of c1, . . . , c`, (dx)1, . . . , (dx)`. Using this interpretation, we may instantiate
this proof system using the same methods as in Proof System 0.
5 Security Proof
In this section, we show that the protocol in Figure 2 is a VOPRF achieving
security against malicious adversaries. In particular, corrupted clients and servers
that attempt to subvert the protocol learn/affect only as much as in an ideal
world, where they interact via the functionality FVOPRF.
Theorem 2. (Security) Assume p|q. The protocol in Figure 2 is a secure VO-
PRF protocol (according to Definition 1) if the following conditions hold:
– ∀i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, (Pi,Vi) is a NIZKAoK
– dRLWEq,n,σ is hard,
– q2p  σ




Note that correctness of our protocol with respect to honest clients and
servers is shown in Section 3.3. Therefore, what remains is to show average
malicious client security and malicious server security.
Correctness of non-aborting malicious protocol runs. During the mali-
cious client proof, it will be useful to call on the fact that a non-aborting protocol
transcript enables computation of Fk(x) with overwhelming probability:
12 Using the fact that x2 = x mod q ⇐⇒ x ∈ {0, 1} assuming q is a prime power.
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Lemma 7. Assume that dRLWEq,n,σ is hard, σ and n are poly(κ), and
q
2p 
σ′  max{L · ` · σn3/2, σ2n2}. For any x ∈ {0, 1}L, consider a non-aborting
run of the protocol in Figure 2 between a (potentially malicious) efficient client
C∗ and honest server S. Further, let s be the value that is extractable from the
client’s proof in the query phase. Then, the value of bdx − c · sep is equal to
bax · kep with all but negligible probability.
Proof. We use the notation from Figure 2. First note that for a non-aborting
protocol run, any efficient client C∗ must have produced cx correctly using some
x ∈ {0, 1}L, s, e1 where ‖s‖∞, ‖e1‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n. Suppose that ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ.
We now use the fact that if σ′  max{L · ` · σn3/2, σ2n2}, then e′ ← R(χσ′)1×`
and (ex − e1 · k− e · s) + e′ are statistically close which follows from Lemmas 4
and 2. Therefore, replacing e′ by (ex−e1 ·k−e ·s)+e′ and noting that cx must
be well-formed due to the NIZKAoK, the client output equation in Figure 2 can
be written as ⌊
p
q











To complete the proof, we will use the fact that pq (ax · k + ex) is computation-
ally indistinguishable from uniform random over pqR
1×`
q when ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ
assuming the hardness of dRLWEq,n,σ (Lemma 3). This implies that every coef-
ficient in pq (axk + ex) is at least T away from Z + 1/2 with all but negligible




n+ L · ` · σn3/2
)
 1 ensures
that T ≤ pq · ‖ex + e
′‖∞ with all but negligible probability. It then follows that⌊
p
q












5.1 Malicious Client Proof
Lemma 8 (Average-case malicious client security). Assume that σ and n
are poly(κ), and p|q, and let conditions (i) and (ii) be as follows:
(i) dRLWEq,n,σ is hard,
(ii) q2p  σ
′  max{L · ` · σn3/2, σ2n2}.
If the above conditions hold and (P1,V1) is a NIZKAoK, then the protocol in
Figure 2 has average-case security against malicious clients according to Defini-
tion 1.
Proof. We describe a simulation S that communicates with the functionality
FVOPRF (environment) on one hand, and the malicious client C∗ on the other. S
carries out the following steps:
1. During CRS SetUp, publish honest a,a0,a1, crs1 and (dishonest) simu-





2. Pass the init message onto FVOPRF, then send C∗ a uniform c ← R1×`q with
a simulated proof π0,Sim. Initialise an empty list received.
3. During the Query stage, for each message (cx, π1) from C∗, do:
(a) b ← V1(crs1, cx,a,a0,a1, π1). If b = 0 send abort to the functionality
and abort the protocol with the malicious client. If b = 1 continue.
(b) Extract the values x, s, e1 from π1 using the ZKAoK extractor and send
(query, x) to the functionality.
(c) – If FVOPRF aborts:
S aborts.
– If FVOPRF returns y ∈ R1×`p and ∀y∗, (x,y∗) /∈ received:
(i.e. if this is the first time x is queried) uniformly sample







– If FVOPRF returns y ∈ R`p and ∃y∗s.t.(x,y∗) ∈ received:
(i.e. x was previously queried) Then set yq = y
∗.
(d) Next pick ē′ ← χσ′ and set
d̄x = c · s+ ē′ + yq mod q.
Finally, produce a simulated proof π2,Sim using crs
′
2 and send (d̄x, π2,Sim)
to C∗.
We now argue that C∗ cannot decide whether it is interacting with S or with a
genuine server. Firstly, recognise that (crs′0, crs
′
2) is indistinguishable from hon-
estly created (crs0, crs2). Secondly, the malicious client cannot distinguish the
simulator’s uniform c sent during the Init phase from the real protocol by the
dRLWEq,n,σ assumption (condition (i)). This implies that both the CRS SetUp
and Init phases that S performs are indistinguishable from the real protocol.
The most challenging step is arguing that the simulator’s behaviour in the
Query phase is indistinguishable from the real protocol from the malicious
client’s point of view. We will analyse the behaviour of the simulator assum-
ing that no abort is triggered. We begin by arguing that the server message dx
in the real protocol with respect to any triple (x, s, e1) can be replaced by a re-
lated message c ·s+ax ·k+ex+e′′′ where ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ and e′′′ ← R(χσ′)1×`
without detection by the following statistical argument. We have that the server
response in the real protocol has dx of the form
c · s+ e1 · k + ax · k + e′ (2)
where e′ ← R(χσ′)1×`. By Lemma 2, the message distribution in Equation (2)
is statistically indistinguishable from
a · k · s+ e · s+ ax · k + e′′ = c · s+ ax · k + e′′ (3)
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where e′′ ← R(χσ′)1×` due to the fact that σ′  σ2n2. By a similar argument
along with Lemma 4, the quantity given in Equation (3) is statistically close in
distribution to
c · s+ e′′′ + (ax · k + ex). (4)
where ex ← Ea0,a1,x,σ and e′′′ ← R(χσ′)1×`. Next, using Lemma 3 and condition
(i), we have that the bracketed term in Equation (4) is indistinguishable from
random over R1×`q by the hardness of dRLWEq,n,σ (Lemma 3). In particular, from
an efficient C∗’s point of view, dx cannot be distinguished from
c · s+ e′′′ + ux
Note that on repeated queries, the errors sampled from R(χσ′)
1×` are fresh.
The fact that S samples yq as a uniformly chosen element of a uniformly cho-
sen interval implies the indistinguishability part of average-case malicious client
security.
Next, we show that if the malicious client does indeed compute the correct
value from the messages it receives from the honest server (in the real protocol),
then it can do the same with the messages that it receives from the simulator.
In Lemma 7, we show that a malicious client which does not cause an abort can
compute bax · kep from the messages it receives from the honest server with all
but negligible probability. We now show that this is also the case with the mes-
sages it receives from S. Consider yq sampled by S and also the corresponding
value d̄x. In addition, define ebe := yq− (q/p) ·y ∈ R1×`≤ q2p so that ebe follows the
uniform distribution over R1×`≤ q2p















We also know that with all but negligible probability, ‖ē′‖∞ ≤ σ′
√
n, and that
‖ebe‖∞ is less than q/(2p) − T with all but negligible probability as long as
T  (q/2p). Taking T = σ′
√






implying that the quantity in Equation (5) rounds correctly to y with all but
negligible probability. Therefore, both the real protocol and simulator enable
correct evaluation of the PRF. ut
5.2 Malicious Server Proof
Lemma 9. Let conditions (i) and (ii) be as follows:





If the above conditions hold and (P0,V0) and (P2,V2) are both NIZKAoKs, then
the protocol in Figure 2 is secure in the presence of malicious servers.
Proof. We construct a simulator S interacting with the malicious server S∗ on
one hand and with the functionality FVOPRF on the other. The simulator S
behaves as follows:
1. During the CRS.SetUp phase, publish honest a,a0,a1, crs0, crs2 and (dis-
honest) simulated crs′1 to use with the proof systems.
2. During the Init-C phase, if S∗ sends c ∈ R1×`q and an accepting proof π0,
then use the zero knowledge extractor to obtain a key k′ from π0 and forward
this on to the functionality. If the message is not of the correct format, or
the proof does not verify, then abort.
3. During the Query phase, select a uniform random value u ← R1×`q , and
using the ZK simulator, produce a simulated proof π1,Sim using crs
′
1. Send
the message (u, π1,Sim). Wait for a response of the form (d̃x, π̃2) from S∗. If
the proof π̃2 verifies, forward on deliver to FVOPRF. Otherwise, forward abort
to FVOPRF.
We will show that the joint output of an honest client C and S∗ in the real
world (where they interact directly) and the ideal world (where they interact via
FVOPRF and S) are computationally indistinguishable. We begin by arguing that
the malicious server S∗ cannot distinguish whether it is interacting with a real
client or S, as described above. Firstly, replacing crs1 by crs′1 is indistinguishable
from the point of view of S∗ by definition of a simulated CRS. Importantly, if S∗
can produce valid proofs in the Init phase, the key k′ obtained by the simulator
is the unique ring element consistent with c (see Lemma 14 in Appendix B for
more details).
All that is left to consider is the Query phase. Note that in the real protocol,
the client produces cx which takes the form of a RLWE sample offset by some
independent value. This implies that the value cx is pseudorandom under the
hardness of dRLWEq,n,σ. Therefore, the malicious server S∗ cannot distinguish a
real cx from the pair u that S uses. By the properties of a ZK simulator, it follows
that a real client message (cx, π1) and crs1 is indistinguishable from (u, π1,Sim)
and crs′1. Next, if the response from S∗ has a valid proof, then S forwards on
deliver. This means that the ideal functionality passes a PRF evaluation to the
client using the server key k′. We now argue that this emulates the output on
the client side when running the real protocol with malicious server S∗.
The case where the proof verification fails is trivial since the client aborts
in the real and ideal worlds. As a result, we focus on the case where the zero
knowledge proof produced by S∗ verifies correctly. Let s ← R(χσ) and e1 ←
R(χσ)
1×` be sampled by the honest client. For this honest client interacting
with malicious S∗ in the real protocol, observe that
p
q
(dx − c · s) =
p
q
ax · k′ +
p
q
(e1 · k′ − e · s+ e′) (6)
for k′, e′ chosen by S∗ where ‖k′‖∞ ≤ σ ·
√
n and ‖e′‖∞ ≤ σ′ ·
√
n. Therefore,
rounding the quantity in Equation (6) is guaranteed to result in the correct value
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if every coefficient of pq · ax · k
′ is further than∥∥∥∥pq (e1 · k′ − e · s+ e′)
∥∥∥∥
∞
away from Z + 1/2. In other words if S∗ can force incorrect evaluation, it has
found k′ ≤ σ ·
√
n such that a coefficient of ax · k′ is within a distance∥∥∥e1 · k′ − e · s+ e′∥∥∥
∞











that S∗ forcing incorrect evaluation with non-negligible probability violates the
assumption that 1D-SISq/2p,n·`,max{`·σn3/2,2σ2n2+σ′
√
n} is hard. Therefore, condi-
tion (ii) enforces correct evaluation. ut
5.3 Setting Parameters
Let κ be the security parameter. Ignoring the NIZKAoK requirements for sim-
plicity, Theorem 2 requires the following conditions:
– dRLWEq,n,σ is hard,
– q2p  σ




We will be using the presumed hardness of SIVPγ for approximation factors
γ = 2o(
√
n). The SIVPγ lattice dimension associated to RLWE will be n = κ
c
(for some constant c > 2); the dimension associated to 1D-SIS hardness will be
n′ = κ. We first choose L = κ, σ = poly(n) and σ′ = σ2n2 · κω(1), and then set
q = p·
∏n′
i=1 pi by picking coprime p, p1, . . . , pn′ = σ
′ ·ω(
√
nn′ log q log n′). Having
made these choices, we argue that each of the three conditions are satisfied. We
can apply Theorem 3 to argue RLWE hardness via SIVP for sub-exponential
approximation factors 2Õ(n
1/c) (for c > 2), noting that σ = poly(n) and
q = (σ′)n
′
· ω((n · n′ · log q · log n′)n
′/2)
= 2(2 log(nσ)+ω(1) log κ)·n
1/c
· ω((n · n′ · log q · log n′)n
′/2)
= 2ω(1)·n




Now substituting in ` = log q implies that the second condition can be satisfied.






n · n′ log q · log n′)
= σ2n2 · κω(1) · ω(
√
n · n′ · log q · log n′)
= (n′)ω(1) · ω(
√
n′1+c · log q · log n′).
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Table 1. Parameters of our VOPRF
Parameter Description Requirement Asymptotic
n ring dimension n = poly(κ) poly(κ)
q original modulus q = p · σ′ · κω(1) κω(1)
p rounding modulus — poly(κ)
` log2(q) — ω(1)
σ secret/error distribution q/σ = 2o(
√
n) poly(κ)
σ′ drowning distribution σ′ = σ2n2 · κω(1) κω(1)
L bit-length of PRF input — —
So applying Lemma 10, we get hardness of our 1D-SIS instance via the presumed
hardness of SIVP on n′-dimensional lattices for (n′)
ω(1) · poly(n′) approximation
factors. We summarise the parameters of our construction in Table 1.
To give a rough estimate for concrete bandwidth costs, we start by observing
that we need q to be super-polynomial in κ for (a) PRF correctness and (b)
noise drowning on the server side. We may pick log q ≈ 256 for κ = 128. Ap-
plying the “estimator” from [2] with the quantum cost model from [3] and noise
standard deviation σ = 3.2 suggests that n = 16, 384 provides security of > 2128
operations (indeed, significantly more, suggesting room for fine tuning). Thus,
a single RLWE sample takes about 0.5MB. As specified in Section 3 our con-
struction sends 2 ` such samples. However, an implementation could send only
two such samples (see Secction 3.2). Thus, each party would send about 1MB
of RLWE sample material. Of course, a more careful analysis and optimisation
– picking parameters, analysing bounds, applying rounding, perhaps removing
the need for super-polynomial drowning – would reduce this magnitude.
In addition to this, each party must send material for the zero-knowledge
proofs. In Appendix C, we show that the statement associated to the client proof
may be written as an instance of R∗ consisting of more than m′ = n`2(L − 1)
equations where the witness has a dimension of more than n′ = 4n`2(L − 1).
Additionally, there are at least |M| := 4n`2(L − 1) constraints. This implies
that the argument system of [61] requires the communication of at least m′ +
3n′ + 4|M| = 9n`2(L− 1) integers modulo q per repetition. Using the concrete
parameters laid out above, we require > 9 · 16, 384 · 2562 · 127 > 240 bits of
communication per repetition. We remind the reader that choosing parameters of
the ZKAoK of Yang appropriately would allow us to only repeat a small number
of times and stress that this discussion gives a crude lower bound designed to
give an intuition on the inefficiency of our scheme, rather than a formal analysis
of the concrete cost of our scheme. We note that applying a SNARK or STARK
would reduce the bandwidth requirement for proofs.
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A Computational Lattice Problems
An n-dimensional lattice Λ is a discrete subgroup of Rn. The ith successive
minimum of a lattice Λ, denoted by λi(Λ), is the radius of the smallest ball
centred at the origin containing at least i linearly independent lattice vectors. In
addition to the 1D-SIS and RLWE problems, we define the 1D-SISR problem:
Definition 8. ([17, Definition 3.6]) Let q = p ·
∏
i∈[n] pi where p1 < · · · < pn
and p are all co-prime. Further, let m ∈ N. The 1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t problem is the
following: Given v ← Zmq , find z ∈ Zm with ||z||∞ ≤ t such that 〈v, z〉 ∈
[−t, t] + (q/p)Z.
Next we recall some standard lattice problems.
Definition 9. (SVPγ) The γ-approximate shortest vector problem, denoted SVPγ ,
asks that given any basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, and γ = γ(n) ≥ 1
that one finds a v ∈ Λ\{0} such that ‖v‖∞ ≤ γ · λ1(Λ).
Definition 10. (GapSVPγ) The γ-gap shortest vector problem, denoted GapSVPγ
is the following: Given any basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, γ = γ(n) ≥ 1,
and r ∈ R+, output 1 if λ1(Λ) ≤ r, and 0 if γ · r ≤ λ1(Λ). If γ · r ≤ λ1(Λ) ≤ r,
then any output is acceptable.
Definition 11. (SIVPγ) The γ-shortest independent vectors problem, denoted
SIVPγ is the following: Given any basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ, find n
linearly independent vectors v1, . . . ,vn such that max(‖vi‖2) ≤ γ · λn(Λ).
Writing A ≥ B to denote that there is a polynomial time reduction from B to
A, we rely on the reductions 1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t ≥ 1D-SISq,m,t ≥ (GapSVPγ ,SIVPγ)
and dRLWEq,n,m,σ ≥ SIVPγ formalised in the following lemma statements.
Lemma 10. ([17, Corollary 3.5]) Let n ∈ N and q =
∏
i∈[n] pi where all p1 <
. . . , < pn are co-prime. Let m ≥ cn log q (for some universal constant c). Assum-
ing that p1 ≥ t · ω(
√






Lemma 11. ([17, Corollary 3.7]) Let q, p, t,m be as in Definition 8. Then the
1D-SIS-Rq,p,m,t problem is at least as hard as 1D-SISq/p,m,t. Further, if p1 ≥
t · ω(
√






For hardness, we require that the approximation factors t · Õ(
√
mn) be sub-
exponential (in the lattice dimension) for the general lattice problems in the
corollary above (see below the next lemma). We also recall a reduction from
lattice problems to the RLWE problem:
31
Theorem 3. ([52], Corollary 6.3) Let q = q(n) ≥ 2 and σ < q be such that
σ ≥ ω(1). Then RLWEq,n,σ is at least as hard as SIVPγ over ideal lattices where
γ ≤ max{ω(
√
n log n · q/σ), 2
√
n}.
Previous work [9,20,21,54] shows that the best known algorithms solving
SVPγ for γ = 2
o(
√
n) have a superpolynomial cost in both the classical and
quantum computing models. Therefore, we make the assumption that SIVPγ for
γ = 2o(
√
n) cannot be solved efficiently.
B Various Results
B.1 Removing the restriction on q for 1D-SISq,(·),(·)
Note that Lemma 10 only holds for values of q that have many large coprime fac-
tors. This can severely limit parametrisation of schemes relying on the hardness
of 1D-SIS. Therefore, the following lemma loosens the restriction on q when us-
ing the 1D-SIS assumption at the expense of a larger norm bound on acceptable
solutions.13
Lemma 12. Let q and q′ be integers where q > q′ such that the rounding func-
tion b·eq′ : Zq → Zq′ maps the uniform distribution over Zq to a distribution that
is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution over Zq′ . Then there is a poly-








Proof. Let v ∈ Zmq be a uniform 1D-SISq,m,t instance. By assumption, v′ :=
bveq′ ∈ Zmq′ is statistically close to uniform. In addition, if an algorithm solves the
1D-SISq′,m,t′ problem on instance v
′, it finds z′ such that 〈v′, z′〉 ∈ [−t′, t′]+q′Z
and ‖z′‖∞ ≤ t′. Multiplying by qq′ , we find that 〈
q
q′ v
′, z′〉 ∈ [− qq′ t
′, qq′ t
′] + qZ.
Note that v = qq′v




′]. Therefore, 〈v, z′〉 = 〈 qq′ v
′, z′〉+ 〈e, z′〉 ∈ [−t, t] + qZ. ut
We next show that as long as q/q′ is negligibly close to an integer, then the
output of the rounding function b·eq′ takes a uniform input distribution to an
output distribution that is statistically close to uniform. For example, if q = κω(1)
and q′ = q − poly(κ), then we may apply Lemma 12.
Lemma 13. Let q and p be integers such that q > p. Then the distribution D







of the uniform distribution over Zp.
13 We are not aware of these lemmas being explicitly stated in the literature, but they
seem to be folklore.
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Proof. We begin by defining k = q/p > 1 and assume that k /∈ Z (otherwise
the lemma trivially holds). In doing so, each w ∈ Zp has either dke or bkc
rounding pre-images. Let X ⊂ Zp denote the set of elements with dke pre-
images and denote its complement by X̄. By the fact that |X| + |X̄| = p and
dke|X| + bkc|X̄| = q, we can show that |X|/q = 1 − bkc/k. Denoting U as the















































The next lemma states that a normal form (or short secret) RLWE public
key corresponds to a unique secret key given certain conditions on q.
Lemma 14. Let n ≥ k > 1 be a power-of-two and q be a prime such that



















Proof. First note that the existence of (k, e) 6= (k′, e′) such that ‖(k, k′, e, e′)‖∞ ≤
β and ak + e = ak′ + e′ mod q, implies that for x1 = k − k′, x2 = e − e′,


















Next, the conditions on q and β allow us to apply [48, Corollary 1.2] which implies
that all non-zero ring elements with infinity norm at most 2β are invertible in Rq.
This implies that for each 2β-bounded (x1, x2) 6= (0, 0), there is precisely a single
a ∈ Rq such that ax1 + x2 = 0 mod q when x1 6= 0 (specifically, a = −x−11 x2)
and no value of a when x1 = 0. Therefore, the maximal number of distinct a’s
allowing for a non-zero 2β-bounded solution to ax1 + x2 = 0 mod q is less than







B.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. We will explicate a reduction from the related 1D-SIS-R,,, problem and
then use Lemma 11 to complete the proof. Consider the following algorithm A
using Dx as a sub-routine that attempts to solve 1D-SIS-Rq,p,n`,max{n·`·B,T} on
input v ∈ Zn`q :
1. Let j ∈ {0, 1} denote the first bit of x and set wj := v ∈ Zn`q .
2. Sample wj̄ ← Zn`q













4. Run r ← D(x,a0,a1).
5. If there is no coefficient of ax · r in the set (q/p) · Z + [−T ′, T ′], then abort.
6. Otherwise let x′ be the input x with the first bit removed. There is a coef-
ficient of ax · r = aj · G−1(ax′) · r in (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ] meaning that for
some k∗, there is a column of G−1(ax′) · r, say y ∈ R`q such that the Xk
∗
coefficient of 〈aj ,y〉 is in (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ].
7. Let 1(·) be an indicator function. Noting that the coefficient of X






vin+k · (−1)1k>k∗ (yi)k∗−k mod n,
output z ∈ Zn`q where zin+k = (−1)1k>k∗ (yi)k∗−k mod n for i = 0, . . . , ` − 1,
k = 0, . . . , n− 1.
It is clear that if A does not abort, it outputs a vector z ∈ Zn`q such that
〈v, z〉 ∈ (q/p) · Z + [−T, T ]. Furthermore, if no abort occurs, then the entries of
z (up to a sign) correspond to the coefficients of a column of r ·G−1(ax′) where
‖r‖∞ ≤ B with non-negligible probability. Recalling that G−1(ax′) ∈ R`×`q is a
binary decomposition of polynomials, we can see that,
||z||∞ ≤ ` · n ·B
with non-negligible probability. In other words,A solves the 1D-SIS-Rq,p,n`,max{n`B,T}
problem in polynomial time with non-negligible probability. To complete the
proof, we use Lemma 11. ut
C Instantiating Proof System 1
In this section, we describe in more detail how to instantiate our zero-knowledge
arguments for Proof System 1 in terms of the protocol of Yang et al [61]. Let
q be a prime-power, (n,m) be dimensions, and let Pn denote the power set of
{1, . . . , n}3. The protocol of interest allows to prove knowledge of witnesses #»x
to instances (A, #»y ,M) of the instance-witness set given by
R∗ =
{(
(A, #»y ,M), #»x
)
∈ Zm×nq × Zmq × Pn × Znq :
A· #»x= #»y mod q ∧




Therefore, reducing our statement in Proof System 1 to the form ofR∗ suffices to
describe an instantiation. Additionally, the Yang et al. protocol has a soundness
error of 2/(2p̄ + 1) per repetition where p̄ = poly(κ). Therefore, only κ/ log(p̄)
parallel repetitions are required to reach a soundness error of 2−κ.
The ZK Relation. Recall that G−1 : R1×`q → R`×`q is the non-linear binary
decomposition operation (on ring elements), and G : R`×`q → R1×`q is the powers
of two matrix that undoes G−1 i.e. G := (1, 2, . . . , 2`−1). Also recall that in the
query phase, the client on input x ∈ {0, 1}L computes the value ax where





−1 (. . . )
))
mod q (8)
using public a0,a1 and sends cx = a · s+ e1 + ax. In terms of ax, the relation
we are interested in providing a ZKPoK for is
R = {
(
(a0,a1,a, cx), (s, x, e1)
)
∈ (R1×`q )4 ×
(
R, {0, 1}L, R1×`
)
: cx = a · s+ e1 + ax, ‖s‖∞ ≤ β, ‖e1‖∞ ≤ β}
where β := σ ·
√
n. To begin with, we can describe the computation of ax










cx = a · s+ e1 +G ·B0
where each equation is considered over the ring Rq. Importantly, Bi ∈ R`×`2
represent binary decompositions and a0 and a1 are both in R
1×`
q .
Evaluation of F ′ as a System of Linear Equations. Unfortunately, the
system of equations above is not linear due to the xi and Bi+1 terms and the
fact that G−1 is not a linear operator. In the hope of deriving a linear system
of equations, we first multiply by the linear operator G ∈ R1×`q or equivalently
gT = (1, 2, . . . , 2`−1) ∈ R1×`q . We also represent the terms axi ·Bi+1 as a0 · (1−
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xi) ·Bi+1 +a1 ·xi ·Bi+1. In doing so, we can set b0 = (gT ·B0) ∈ R1×`q to obtain
gT ·BL−1 = a0 · (1− xL−1) + a1 · xL−1 (9)
gT ·BL−2 = a0 · (1− xL−2) ·BL−1 + a1 · xL−2 ·BL−1
gT ·BL−3 = a0 · (1− xL−3) ·BL−2 + a1 · xL−3 ·BL−2
...
b0 = a0 · (1− x0) ·B1 + a1 · x0 ·B1 (10)
cx = a · s+ e1 + b0
We now wish to come up with a ZKPoK allowing to prove knowledge of {(xi)L−1i=0 ,
(Bi)
L−1
i=1 , b0, s, e1} (where s, e1 are short, xi ∈ {0, 1} and Bi ∈ R
`×`
2 are binary
representations of ring elements whose coefficients are at most q−1) satisfying the
above system of equations. Currently, the system is with respect to arithmetic in
Rq rather than Zq. We now describe how to transform the above into a system
over Zq. It should be clear that each ring multiplication can be represented
by a matrix-vector multiplication over Zq. Taking note of this, we can define
A0,A1 ∈ Zn×n`q to be the matrices corresponding to multiplication by elements
a0,a1 ∈ R1×`q respectively. In particular, the jth block of n columns of A0 (resp.
A1) correspond to the negacyclic matrix representing multiplication by the j
th
ring element of a0 (resp. a1). Additionally, denote by
#»a 0 and
#»a 1 ∈ Zn`q , the
coefficients of a0 and a1 respectively concatenated vertically. We next define
A ∈ Zn`×nq to be the vertical concatenation of negacyclic matrices representing
multiplication by the ring elements in a. Then, we define
#»
b i ∈ Zn`
2
q (for i ∈
[L − 1]) to be a vector consisting of coefficients of the ring elements in Bi.
In particular, the jth block of n` entries of
#»
b i correspond to the coefficient
vectors in the ring elements of the jth column of Bi. Next we denote by
#»s , the
vector of coefficients of the ring element s; by #»c , the vertical concatenation of
the coefficients of ring elements in cx; by
#»e 1, the vertical concatenation of the
coefficients of ring elements in e1; and by
#»
b 0 ∈ Zn`q , the vector corresponding to
the coefficients of ring elements in b0 concatenated vertically. Finally, defining
G⊗ = I`⊗ (gT ⊗ In) and A⊗i = I`⊗Ai for i ∈ {1, 2}, we can rewrite the above
as the following system over Zq:
G⊗ · #»b L−1 = #»a 0 · (1− xL−1) + #»a 1 · xL−1
G⊗ · #»b L−2 = A⊗0 · (1− xL−2) ·
#»
b L−1 + A
⊗
1 · xL−2 ·
#»
b L−1
G⊗ · #»b L−3 = A⊗0 · (1− xL−3) ·
#»
b L−2 + A
⊗





b 0 = A
⊗
0 · (1− x0) ·
#»
b 1 + A
⊗
1 · x0 ·
#»
b 1







1 n`) denote the n-dimensional (resp. n`-dimensional) vector with
all entries equal to 1. Now, to address the fact that the entries of #»s and #»e 1 are
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1 n` whose entries ought to lie in the set {0, 1, . . . , 2β}. We also
deploy a special form of binary decomposition. In particular, set δ2β,j = b(2β +
2j−1)/2jc for j = 1, . . . , blog 2βc+ 1 and D2β := In ⊗ (δ2β,1, . . . , δ2β,blog 2βc+1).
As in [43], we can efficiently find a vector #»s ′ ∈ {0, 1}n(blog 2βc+1) such that
D2β
#»s ′ = #»s+ for any #»s+ ∈ {0, . . . , 2β}n. In addition,
∑blog 2βc+1
i=1 δi = 2β so for
any #»x ′ ∈ {0, 1}n(blog 2βc+1), ‖D2β · #»x ′‖∞ ≤ 2β. We define #»e ′1 analogously for
the vector #»e+1 . Using these new variables, we can rewrite our system over Zq as
G⊗ · #»b L−1 = #»a 0 · (1− xL−1) + #»a 1 · xL−1
G⊗ · #»b L−2 = A⊗0 · (1− xL−2) ·
#»
b L−1 + A
⊗




G⊗ · #»b 1 = A⊗0 · (1− x1) ·
#»
b 2 + A
⊗




b 0 = A
⊗
0 · (1− x0) ·
#»
b 1 + A
⊗
1 · x0 ·
#»
b 1
#»c = A ·D2β · #»s ′ + D2β · #»e ′1 +
#»
b 0 − β
(




The final modification ensures that
#»
b i for i ∈ {1, . . . , L − 1} really do corre-
spond to binary decompositions of elements of Rq. Note that since q is not a
power-of-two, one could satisfy the above linear system by using `-bit binary
decompositions of integers larger than q (as long as they are correct modulo q).
Such a solution does not correspond to a correct PRF evaluation. To prevent
this, we use Dq−1 = In` ⊗ (δq,1, . . . , δq,blog q−1c+1) and binary decompositions
#»
h i such that
#»
b i = Dq−1 ·
#»
h i for i ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}. We are now ready to write
out a system of the form considered by R∗. The witness takes the form(
x̃L−1, x̃
′

















#̃»s ′, #̃»e ′1,
#̃»




where the dimensions and quadratic constraints are:
– For i ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, x̃i, x̃′i ∈ {0, 1} i.e. x̃i = x̃i · x̃i








b i where  is a
component-wise product of vectors
–
#̃»
b 0 ∈ Zn`q
– For i ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}, #»f i = x̃i−1 ·
#̃»
b i ∈ Zn`
2
q
– For i ∈ {1, . . . , L− 1}, #»f ′i = x̃′i−1 ·
#̃»
b i ∈ Zn`
2
q
– #̃»s ′, #̃»e ′1 ∈ {0, 1}n(blog 2βc+1), i.e. #̃»s ′ = #̃»s ′  #̃»s ′ and #̃»e ′1 = #̃»e ′1  #̃»e ′1










Note that although parts of the witness will not appear explicitly in the linear
system, they are required to ensure that we may define quadratic constraints to
capture a correct PRF evaluation. The linear system over Zq with respect to the
constraints and witness above is:




1 = x̃L−1 + x̃
′
L−1
G⊗ · #̃»b L−1 = #»a 0 · x̃′L−1 + #»a 1 · x̃L−1
G⊗ · #̃»b L−2 = A⊗0 ·
#»






G⊗ · #̃»b 1 = A⊗0 ·
#»





















= A ·D2β · #̃»s ′ + D2β · #̃»e ′1
Dq−1 ·
#̃»
h 1 = G





⊗ · #̃»b L−1
D An Alternative Construction and a Trick
Here, we will describe a protocol that appeared in a previous draft of this work.
At a high level, this protocol can be seen as following a similar recipe to that
of Figure 2 apart from that the client uses multiplicative blinding on ax rather
than additive blinding. In more detail, whereas our main construction emulates
the DH blinding construction H(x)
k
= (H(x) · gr)k/(gk)r, this appendix aims
























for s, t, v, u s.t. u · s+ v · t = 1.
The main objective of this section is to outline a trick that may be applicable
in other settings. To provide intuition for our alternative VOPRF design, we
describe a basic protocol below that serves as a starting point.
1. The server publishes some commitment to a small key k ∈ Rq.
2. On input x, the client picks invertible s ∈ Rq, small e ∈ R1×`q and sends
cx = ax · s+ e.
3. On input small k ∈ Rq, the server sends dx = cx ·k+e′ for small e′ ∈ R1×`q .
4. The client outputs y =
⌊
p





We will focus on correctness to motivate our trick while ignoring security.
Note that we would like to say that⌊
p
q






· ax · k +
p
q






· ax · k
⌉
.
Thus, we guarantee correctness if all coefficients of pq · ax · k are at least∣∣∣∣pq (e · k · s−1 + e′ · s−1)
∣∣∣∣
∞
away from Z + 12 . It turns out that if all coefficients of s
−1 are small, then this
condition is satisfied with extremely high probability due to the 1-dimensional
short integer solution (1D-SIS) assumption [17]. As before, the form of ax is
crucial to the connection with the 1D-SIS problem. In particular, we rely on the
fact that we can decompose ax as a
′
1 · a′2 where a′1 ∈ R1×`q is uniform random
and a′2 ∈ R`×`q has entries that are polynomials with binary coefficients.
Unfortunately, this simplified protocol cannot quite be realised using stan-
dard RLWE secret distributions. The problem is that (to our knowledge) there
is no standard RLWE secret distribution where samples from the distribution
are guaranteed to have small inverses in Rq. To overcome this issue, we apply a
technique for sampling “full” NTRU keys [34,55]. Firstly, we sample small ring
elements s and t from a discrete Gaussian distribution. Secondly, we use the
extended GCD algorithm – in combination with Babai’s rounding algorithm –
to recover small u and v, such that u · s+ v · t = 1 mod Rq. To adapt the basic




x · k + e′1, d2x = c2x · k + e′2.





u · d1x + v · d2x
)⌉
. Correctness then relies on the fact
that
u · d1x + v · d2x = ax ·
=1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(us+ vt) · k + u · (e1 · k + e′1) + v · (e2 · k + e′2)




2 are small. For completeness, we in-
clude the algorithm for sampling (u, v) on input (s, t) as well as a discussion
bounding the size of u and v below.
In the following we use: res(·, ·) to refer to the computation of the resultant of
two polynomials; xgcd(·, ·) to refer to the computation of the extended GCD of
two integers; and s? to refer to the conjugate of s in R. The sampling algorithm
fullNTRU(s, t) runs the following steps.
1. Compute rs = res(s,X
n + 1) ∈ Z and u′ ∈ R s.t. u′ · s = rs.
2. Compute rt = res(t,X
n + 1) ∈ Z and v′ ∈ R s.t. v′ · t = rt.
3. Compute r, u′′, v′′ = xgcd(rs, rt). If r 6= 1: abort
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4. Set ū = u′′ · u′ ∈ R and v̄ = v′′ · v′ ∈ R.




v̄ · s? − ū · t?
s · s? + t · t?
⌉
.
(b) Update (u, v) = (ū+ r · t, v̄ − r · s) ∈ R2.
6. If ‖(u, v)‖ > 2nσ, output ⊥. Else, return u, v.
Probability that r 6= 1. To show that the sampling algorithm does not abort (with
overwhelming probability) in Step 3, we need to show that the ideal generated by
s and t is the full ring R with noticeable probability. Recalling that s, t← DR,σ,
Lemma 4.2 and 4.4 of [58] shows that this probability is at least 1 − O(1) (for
large enough σ). This implies that with noticeable probability, the algorithm
does not abort in Step 4.
Upper Bound on ‖(u, v)‖. In order to show that the sampling algorithm does
indeed output a pair (u, v), we analyse the probability that ‖(u, v)‖ > 2nσ
here. Our analysis follows [58]. Babai’s rounding technique is an efficient way
of obtaining a candidate solution to the closest vector problem (CVP). Given
a lattice Λ with basis B (which need not be an invertible square matrix) and
a target point t in the real span of B, Babai’s rounding technique outputs the
lattice vector w = Bb(BTB)−1BT te. The offset vector obtained can therefore
be written as
t−w = B ·
(











Let bi denote the i











We now use this analysis to give an upper bound on ‖(u, v)‖ computed by
fullNTRU(s, t). At a high level, the first four steps find a (potentially very long)
pair (ū, v̄) ∈ R2 such that ū · s + v̄ · t = 1 and the final two steps update
this to (u, v) using Babai’s rounding technique. In particular, suppose we define
S, T ∈ Zn×n to be the negacyclic matrices denoting multiplication by s and
t respectively. Then the final two steps run Babai’s rounding technique on the
lattice Λ = {z ∈ Z2n : [S|T ]·z = 0} with basis B = [T |−S]T ∈ Z2n×n (which has
linearly independent columns by invertibility of s, t in the field Q(X)/〈Xn+1〉).
Decomposing (ū, v̄) = (ū⊥, v̄⊥) + (ūB , v̄B) where (ū⊥, v̄⊥) is the component of
(ū, v̄) orthogonal to the span of B and (ūB , v̄B) belongs to the span of B, we use
the target vector (ūB , v̄B). Bounding the norm of the offset (via Equation (14))
and noting that (ū⊥, v̄⊥) is orthogonal to this offset gives us a bound for the
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final value of ‖(u, v)‖. Each column of our basis consists of the coefficients of
s, t← χσ, so by Lemma 1 we obtain the bound












= ‖(ū⊥, v̄⊥)‖+ nσ
that holds with all but negligible probability over the choice of s and t. To bound
the above further, note that by definition we have ‖(ū⊥, v̄⊥)‖ ≤ minr′∈K ‖(u +
r′t, v − r′s)‖. On considering r′ = vs−1 and the fact that ūs + v̄t = 1, we have
that ‖(ū⊥, v̄⊥)‖ ≤ ‖(s−1, 0)‖. Lemma 4.1 of [58] shows that ‖s−1‖ ≥ ω(
√
n)/σ
only with probability o(1). Therefore, we have that the pair (u, v) computed by
fullNTRU(s, t) satisfies
‖(u, v)‖ ≤ nσ + nσ
with probability 1 − o(1), meaning that the sampling algorithm succeeds with
noticeable probability.
E A Generic MPC Based Construction
One could alternatively instantiate VOPRFs using generic techniques for estab-
lishing Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols by treating a single execution
of the VOPRF protocol, for a PRF like AES, as a single invocation of a classical
two-party actively secure MPC protocol. Such protocols are now very efficient,
and can be based on post-quantum assumptions. However, to match our re-
quirements – the round-optimality of the scheme that we devise in this work –
we would require that the MPC protocol can be completed in two rounds (one
message from the client and one message from the server).
This essentially rules out approaches based on efficient LSSS-based protocols
such as SPDZ [22]. In addition, in spite of recent advances, the SPDZ proto-
col [57] still requires RLWE parameter settings that use a similar size polynomial
degree (n ≈ 214), but with a more structured, and larger, modulus. Concretely,
the construction of [57] requires that q has two prime factors with minimum sizes
p0 ∼ 2216 and p1 ∼ 2164; our construction requires an unstructured q of size 2256.
As such, any implementation using the SPDZ paradigm would be noticeably less
efficient than our protocol. See Section 5.3 for more details on our parameters.
Due to the above remarks, the need for round-optimality leads us to consider
Garbled Circuit based constructions; where the server (say) creates a garbling
of the PRF which is then evaluated by the client. A VOPRF supports being
called many times by many different callers, while some applications might not
require it, the primitive supports it. Thus a possible solution would be for the
initialization phase to consist of the server choosing a key k for the AES cipher,
and then committing to it by computing and publishing h = H(k‖r) for some
random value r and some hash function H (e.g. SHA-256 or SHA-3). Then on
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invocation by a client for some input value x, the server and the client could
engage in a two-party protocol to compute the function, where we denote by [v]s
(and [v]c) a value which is kept secret by the server (resp. the client), and [v] a
value which is hidden from both the client and the server.
– [v]← AES([k]s, [x]c).
– [b]← (h 6= H([k]s, [r]s)).
– [a]c ← ([b]· ⊥) + (1− [b]) · [v].
Note, the need for the checking of the public commitment h to avoid the server
changing the key on each invocation, or having a different key for different clients.
To obtain our security guarantees we would need the protocol to be executed
using an actively secure two-party protocol. But such a protocol is impossible to
realise using our requisite two rounds. Indeed actively secure two-party compu-
tation requires a minimum of five rounds (see [39]). If one was only interested in
passive security, then a four round protocol would follow from Yao’s original two-
party construction. Thus whilst the execution time for a Garbled-Circuit based
construction may be more efficient than our protocol, the round complexity will
never match our protocol. It is thus an open problem to obtain a VOPRF pro-
tocol with the efficiency of (say) the passively secure implementation via Yao’s




A very rough (!) proof of concept implementation.
"""
from sage.all import matrix , vector
from sage.all import ceil , log , xgcd , next_prime , inverse_mod





def __init__(self , n, p, q):
"""
Setup
:param n: ring dimension , must be power of two
:param p: rounding modulus





self.ell = ceil(log(q, 2))












for _ in range(self.ell)
],
)
for _ in range (3)
]
self.k = self.sample_small ()
self.c = self.a[2] * self.k + self.sample_small(
scalar=False
) # a[2] == a in Figure 2
def bp14(self , x, k=1):
"""
Evaluate BP14 on input ‘x‘ and key ‘k‘
:param x: a vector of bits




for i in range(1, L)[:: -1]:
t = self.ginv(self.modred(self.a[x[i]] * t))
ax = self.modred(self.a[x[0]] * t)
e = self.sample_small(scalar=False)
return self.modred(ax * k) + e
def sample_small(self , bound=1, scalar=True):
"""
Sample a small element in R or Rˆl
:param bound: l_oo bound on coefficients










[self.sample_small () for _ in range(self.ell)],
)
def modred(self , v):
"""
Reduce an element in Rˆl modulo phi
:param v: an element in Rˆl
"""
return vector(self.R, self.ell , [v_ % self.phi for v_ in v])
def nice_lift(self , h):
"""
Return a balanced integer representation of an element in R.
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:param h: an element in R
"""
r = []
h = h % self.phi
for e in h:





def ginv(self , a):
"""
Return Gˆ-1(a), i.e. bit decomposition.
:param a: an element in Rˆl
"""
A = matrix(self.R, self.ell , self.ell)
for i in range(self.ell):
a_ = a[i]. change_ring(ZZ)
for j in range(self.ell):
A[j, i] = self.R(
[(ZZ(a__) // 2 ** j) % 2 for a__ in a_]
)





Vector G = [1,2,4,...] in Rˆl
"""
return vector(
self.R, self.ell , [2 ** i for i in range(self.ell)]
)
def __call__(self , x):
"""
Run the protocol on ‘x‘, ignoring zero -knowledge proofs





cx = self.bp14(x) + self.a[2] * s + e1
# SERVER
e_ = self.sample_small(bound=2 ** 64, scalar=False)
dx = self.modred(cx * self.k + e_)
# CLIENT
y = self.nice_lift ((dx - self.c * s)[0])








:param n: ring dimension , must be power of two
:param p: rounding modulus





self.ell = ceil(log(q, 2))
# NOTE: we do modular reductions mod phi = Xˆn+1 hand
self.R_Z = ZZ["x"]
self.X = self.R_Z.gen()








for _ in range(self.ell)
],
)
for _ in range (2)
]
self.k = self.sample_small ()
def full_ntru(self , s, t):
"""
Return small ‘u,v‘ s.t. ‘u*s + v*t = 1‘
:param s: a small element in R




u_ = (Rs * s.change_ring(QQ). inverse_mod(self.phi)) % self.phi
v_ = (Rt * t.change_ring(QQ). inverse_mod(self.phi)) % self.phi
r, u__ , v__ = xgcd(Rs, Rt)
u = u__ * u_




ft = -f[self.n // 2] * self.X ** (self.n // 2) + f[0]
for i in range(1, self.n // 2):
ft += (
-f[i] * self.X ** (self.n - i)
- f[self.n - i] * self.X ** i
)
return ft
def xgcd_reduce(f, g, G, F):
"""
https :// eprint.iacr.org /2019/015 solves f*G’ - g*F’ == f*G - g*F
We map s,t,u,v to f,g, -G, F.
"""
f, g, F, G = f, g, F, -G
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for j in range (32):
num = (F * conjugate(f) + G * conjugate(g)) % self.phi








round(c) * self.X ** i
for i, c in enumerate(list(k))
]
)
if k == 0:
break
F, G = (F - k * f) % self.phi , (G - k * g) % self.phi
return -G, F
u, v = xgcd_reduce(s, t, u, v)
return u, v
def __call__(self , x):
"""
Run the protocol on ‘x‘, ignoring zero -knowledge proofs




s = self.sample_small ()
t = self.sample_small ()
u, v = self.full_ntru(s, t)
if (u * s + v * t) % self.phi == 1:
break
c1 = self.bp14(x, s)
c2 = self.bp14(x, t)
# SERVER
d1 = self.modred(
c1 * self.k + self.sample_small(bound=2 ** 64, scalar=False)
) # for "drowning"
d2 = self.modred(
c2 * self.k + self.sample_small(bound=2 ** 64, scalar=False)
)
# CLIENT
yx = self.nice_lift ((u * d1 + v * d2)[0])
return yx // (self.q / self.p)
# instantiate with some toy parameters
def test(cls=VOPRFPoC , p=3, q_size =96, n=256):
q_ = next_prime (2 ** q_size)
voprf = cls(n, p, p * q_)
return voprf([0, 1]) == voprf([0, 1])
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